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We analyze ﬁrms’ incentives to cluster in an industrial district to beneﬁtf r o m
reciprocal technology spillovers. A simple model of cumulative innovation is presented
where technology spillovers arise endogenously through labor mobility. It is shown
that ﬁrms’ incentives to cluster are the strongest when the following three conditions
are met: 1) the growth potential of an industry is high; 2) competition in the product
market is relatively soft; 3) the probability of a single ﬁrm to develop an innovation
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During the 80s and the 90s Silicon Valley has been the prototypical example of a successful
industrial district. In the mid 90s it was home to twenty percent of the world’s largest
technology companies (Businessweek, 25.08.1997) and the mean income was 50 percent
higher than the national ﬁgure (Audretsch, 1998). The recipe of its success has been
studied extensively and several attempts have been promoted to replicate the industrial
structure of Silicon Valley elsewhere in the world.
The clustering of many technology companies in a circumscribed geographical area
generates several important eﬀects (see, e.g., Marshall, 1920). First, the local market for
inputs and services expands: on the one hand, this allows providers of inputs to achieve
a higher degree of specialization and lower their prices; on the other hand, technology
companies can deepen their own capabilities by relying on external sources for the supply
of skills, technologies, and other resources (Stigler, 1951).1 Second, the concentration
of ﬁrms attracts a ’deep’ pool of workers. In turn, this implies that ﬁrms and workers
are better matched and are less likely to be restricted in their labor demand and supply,
respectively (Krugman, 1991b).
Finally, there is a technology spillover eﬀect, which is the focus of our paper.2 Techno-
logical knowledge and information, more in general, are extremely diﬃcult to keep conﬁned
within the boundary of the ﬁrm due to their ethereal nature. The empirical evidence shows
that ﬁrms’ productivity increases thanks to spillovers but the beneﬁcial eﬀects of spillovers
decay with geographic distance (Jaﬀe et al., 1993; Acs et al., 1994; Alemeida and Kogut,
1999). This provides an argument for spillover driven clustering. In other words, ﬁrms may
want to cluster to enjoy technology spillovers from each other.3 Such spillovers may be the
result of voluntary exchanges of information, informal talks among employees, mobility of
workers, or even industrial espionage. However, this argument, after a second thought,
appears at least incomplete. When technological knowledge is widespread at the level of
the industry, an important source of competitive advantage is leveled out - ﬁrms must
compete on equal footing. Especially when product market competition is intense, ﬁrms
1”By focusing on what they did best and purchasing the reminder from specialist suppliers, they created
a network system that spread the costs of developing new technologies, reduced product-development times,
fostered reciprocal innovation.” (Saxenian, 1994). Following Krugman (1991a), this eﬀect has been studied
extensively in the recent literature.
2Needless to say that clustering might have other eﬀects. Some of them, such as congestion, are
undesirable.
3Audretsch and Feldman (1996) ﬁnd evidence in this direction showing that technology intensive indus-
tries tend to cluster more than other industries after controlling for geographic concentration of production.
1might try to locate in distant areas in order to minimize technology spillovers and preserve
their competitive advantage. Ultimately, the presence of technology spillovers might turn
out to be a reason against industrial clustering.
Saxenian (1994) and Almeida and Kogut (1999) have nicely documented how engineers
and technical workers in Silicon Valley change jobs repeatedly contributing to the creation
of technology spillovers (the annual turnover rate among highly-skilled personnel was ap-
proximately 20-25% in the early 1990s). There is some debate about the causes of such
high labor turnover. Saxenian argues that the movement of workers between employers
(and start-ups) is the result of a business culture that supports job hopping. Challenging
this view, legal scholars have stressed the importance of trade secret protection (Gilson,
1999; Hyde, 2001).4 In principle, the laws of trade secrets require an employee trusted with
a trade secret never to reveal it to another ﬁrm. In practice, the legal protection of trade
secrets is far from complete.5 The ﬁrst obstacle facing any ﬁrm alleging a misappropria-
tion of a trade secret is to demonstrate that a trade secret exists. This often proves to be
diﬃcult as the information constituting a trade secret is unknown to the public and may
not be easily deﬁned.6 The alleging ﬁrm’s position is particularly weak in cases concerning
employees defecting to competitors. Courts are concerned about employees’ freedom to
seek new job opportunities. They are thus reluctant to prevent an employee from working
for a competitor by granting injunctive relief or enforcing a very restrictive non-compete
covenant. Hyde and Gilson argue that trade secret protection is particularly weak in Cal-
ifornia and that this explains the high labor turnover in Silicon Valley. However, both the
cultural and the legal explanations of the high labor turnover seem to forget that ﬁrms
have monetary instruments to keep their employees: they might simply pay a higher wage
in order to avoid turnover and constrain the outward knowledge ﬂow.
In this paper we build a simple model that oﬀers an economic rationale to the empirical
evidence discussed above. An entrepreneur (a ﬁrm) needs a researcher (a worker) to run his
R&D department. An important ingredient of our model is that knowledge and innovation
are cumulative. The R&D activity gives rise to knowledge, which is valuable both for
4A trade secret is any valuable piece of information that is not commonly known in the industry and
that the ﬁrm makes an eﬀort to protect.
5T h ed i s c u s s i o nh e r ei sb a s e do nt r a d es e c r e tp r o t e c t i o ni nt h eU Su n d e rt h eU n i f o r mT r a d eS e c r e t sA c t
(see, e.g., Choate et al. (1987) and Budden (1996)). The laws of trade secrets build on the same principles
in most countries, so the problems sketched here are also present outside the US.
6Some trade secrets such as a formula or a customer list can be easily identiﬁed. However, many trade
secrets have an element of tacit knowledge, and it is hard to draw the line between the general knowledge
that an employee has received through his education, background, and work experience, and the speciﬁc
knowledge that he has received from an employer and that one could classify as a trade secret.
2directly commercializing a product (ﬁrst generation) and for being the basis for a new and
better version of the product (second generation). We follow Pakes and Nitzan (1983)
and endogenize technology spillovers through labor mobility. After having successfully
developed the ﬁrst generation product, the worker can move to a rival ﬁrm enabling it to
use the knowledge embedded in the product. The movement of the worker contributes to
make the knowledge widespread at the industry level thereby rising the likelihood that the
second generation product will be developed. We explicitly consider the competition for
the services of the worker, and technology spillovers arise only if the rival ﬁrm is willing
to oﬀer a higher wage to the worker than the current employer.
We then move a step backwards in the game tree and allow ﬁrms to choose locations.
Each ﬁrm can either decide to locate in a separate region or to ’cluster’ in the same area as
the rival. In our model, technology spillovers are the only reason for ﬁrms to cluster. Put
diﬀerently, technology spillovers are a necessary condition for ﬁrms to cluster. However,
technology spillovers are not a suﬃcient condition, because workers earn a higher expected
wage when ﬁrms locate together. In equilibrium, ﬁrms cluster only if the expected beneﬁts
from technology spillovers outweigh the additional wage bill.
We identify three conditions that increase the beneﬁts from technology spillovers and
strengthen ﬁrms’ incentives to cluster. First, product market competition is soft, so the
additional competition due to technology spillovers does dissipate too much rent. Second,
the probability of a single ﬁrm to develop the second generation product is neither very
small nor very large. Third, the value of the second generation product is high relative to
the ﬁrst. These last two conditions ensure that the beneﬁts of having one more ﬁrm trying
to develop the second generation product are high.
Finally, we use our framework to analyze how trade secret protection aﬀects both the
decision to cluster and the intensity of labor mobility. We show that a system of trade secret
protection based on punitive damages, except in some extreme cases, increases proﬁts,
stimulates clustering, and is not an impediment to technology spillovers. Trade secret
protection that prevents technology spillovers from arising (post-employment covenants
not to compete, injunctive relief, or excessive damages) does not induce clustering and
reduces proﬁts.
Technology spillovers and high-tech clusters have received attention both from indus-
trial economists and economic geographers. Katz (1986), Kamien et al. (1992), and Choi
(1993) have studied the relationship between technology spillovers and research joint ven-
3tures (RJVs). A RJV allows ﬁrms to coordinate their R&D investments and to share the
R&D outcomes. There is, therefore, a parallelism between RJVs and high-tech clusters.
Indeed, joining a cluster can be seen as a way for ﬁrms to share knowledge in circumstances
in which more eﬃcient contractual arrangements such as licensing, RJVs, or patent pooling
are not available. An important diﬀerence with respect to our work is that the literature
on RJVs does not elucidate the mechanism through which such spillovers take place and,
typically, treats technology spillovers as exogenous.7
More recently some authors have recognized that an important source of technology
spillovers is labor mobility. Following Pakes and Nitzan (1983), this literature has treated
technology spillovers as endogenous: ﬁrms actively try to prevent workers from leaving and
to ’poach’ workers from competitors. In this vein, Fosfuri et al. (2001) analyze technology
spillovers due to workers’ mobility from multinationals to local ﬁrms, and Gersbach and
Schmutzler (2002) study how the presence of endogenous spillovers aﬀects the incentives
to invest in cost-reducing innovations. Related to this, there has been some work on how
ﬁrms can design their organization in order to avoid that valuable knowledge spills over
to competitors through workers’ mobility. See, e.g., Rajan and Zingales (2001), Rønde
(2001), and Zabojnik (2002).
There are two recent papers that study the functioning of industrial clusters when
technology spillovers arise through labor mobility, but focus on issues complementary to
the ones analyzed in this paper. Cooper (2001) looks at ﬁrms’ and workers’ investment in
R&D and human capital, respectively: an aspect that we discuss brieﬂyi na ne x t e n s i o n .
However, he abstracts from the strategic interaction between the labor and the product
markets, which plays a crucial role in our model, and does not consider the location choice
of ﬁrms. Combes and Duranton (2001) use like us the model introduced by Pakes and
Nitzan (1983) as a building block. There are, however, a number of diﬀerences between
their and our work. Most importantly, we focus on cumulative innovations and trade secret
laws whereas Combes and Duranton consider the interaction between product diﬀerentia-
tion and the ’absorptive capacity’ of ﬁrms.
Our paper is also related to the literature on patents and cumulative R&D (Scotchmer,
1991). This literature has primarily looked at the role of patents in providing adequate
incentives to sequential innovators. Little attention has been placed on the importance of
technology spillovers. A recent exception is Bessen and Maskin (2000) who present a simple
7Mai and Peng (1999) use such ’black-box’ type of spillovers to study ﬁrms’ incentives to cluster.
4model of cumulative R&D, and ask the question of whether stronger patent protection leads
to more or to less innovation. The analysis of patent protection is diﬀerent from that of
trade secret protection,8 but Bessen and Maskin also reach the conclusion that very strong
protection of intellectual property may slow down innovation and reduce overall welfare.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the basic
model, and section 3 derives the theoretical relationship between technology spillovers,
labor mobility and clustering. Section 4 discusses some extensions of our basic model, and
section 5 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
2.1 The ﬁrst period
Consider a world where there are two periods and two entrepreneurs each running a ﬁrm.
Denote the two ﬁrms as A and B. At the beginning of the game, ﬁrms must choose
irrevocably their locations. The ﬁrms can either decide to locate in separate regions or
to cluster in the same area. The ﬁrms have no marketable product at this stage. After
locating, each ﬁrm hires a researcher (a worker) to develop a product. The worker is hired
from a pool of identical workers. Workers have a reservation wage w, which is normalized
to zero. Workers are wealth-constrained and cannot borrow on the ﬁnancial markets, so
the ﬁrst-period wage must be non-negative.
We assume that each ﬁrm undertakes a costless R&D project that has an exogenous
probability s of succeeding. We relax this assumption in section 4 where the probability
of success is endogenized. The successes of the two ﬁrms’ R&D projects are independently
distributed. A successful project leads to an innovation that we will denote as innovation 1.
With probability (1 − s) the project is unsuccessful, and the ﬁrm stays out of the market
in the ﬁrst period. Once the innovation process is resolved, production takes place, the
good is sold, and ﬁrst-period proﬁts are realized. The value of exploiting innovation 1 as a
monopolist is π1.I fb o t hﬁrms develop the innovation, the duopoly proﬁts are απ1.T h e
parameter α measures the degree of product market competition, with lower values of α






8Most notably, a patent assigns an exclusive right to its holder, whereas trade secret laws do not protect
against independent, although identical, innovations by other ﬁrms.
52.2 The second period
In the second period ﬁrms have the possibility to develop a new and better version of
the product (innovation 2), but only if they have access to the knowledge created when
developing innovation 1. R&D is therefore cumulative. This knowledge also allows ﬁrms
to exploit innovation 1 in the second period if they fail to develop innovation 2. We
assume again that R&D is costless and that the probability of success is s (conditional on
having the necessary knowledge) and is independently distributed across ﬁrms. Innovation
2 is drastic with respect to innovation 1. Hence, a ﬁrm endowed with innovation 2 earns
monopoly proﬁts both when the rival has innovation 1 and when it has no product at all.
Monopoly proﬁts of exploiting innovation 2 are π2, whereas duopoly proﬁts are απ2.
We make two simplifying assumptions concerning the knowledge created in the ﬁrst
period. First, after developing innovation 1, the entrepreneur and the worker have all
the relevant information. Therefore, if the worker employed in the ﬁrst period leaves, the
entrepreneur can instruct another worker and continue the R&D activity uninterruptedly.
Second, if the two ﬁr m sh a v ee x p e r i e n c e dt h es a m eR & Do u t c o m ei nt h eﬁrst period (either
success or failure), they have the same knowledge and have no gains from acquiring each
other’s knowledge. Notice that a worker possesses valuable knowledge if he has worked for
the only successful ﬁrm in period 1. In all other states of the world, workers are simply
paid the reservation wage.
The outcome of the second period depends on the results of the R&D activities in the
ﬁrst period. We will therefore describe the game in the second period for the diﬀerent
possible states of the world.
No ﬁrm has developed innovation 1 The ﬁrms start all over again, and everything
is as in period 1 except that ﬁrms do not choose location.
Both ﬁrms have developed innovation 1 The two ﬁrms aim at developing innovation
2. A ﬁrm earns π2 if it is the only one to develop innovation 2 whereas the rival earns 0.
The ﬁrms earn απ2 if they both succeed and απ1 if they both fail.
Only one ﬁrm has developed innovation 1 Assume that ﬁrm A has developed
innovation 1 and ﬁrm B has not (the other case is analogous). Firm B would like to
h i r et h ee m p l o y e eo fﬁrm A to acquire the knowledge necessary to develop innovation
62.9 We assume that this is only feasible when ﬁrms are located in the same region, for
instance, because relocation costs or informational costs of identifying the ’right’ worker
are large across regions. This assumption is relaxed in section 4. We need to consider the
two subgames where the ﬁrms are in the same region and in separate regions.
Suppose that the ﬁrms have chosen separate locations. Firm A tries to develop inno-
vation 2 and ﬁrm B innovation 1. Firm A drives ﬁrm B out of the market if it is successful
and earns π2.I fﬁrm A fails, but ﬁrm B succeeds, both ﬁrms earn απ1. Finally, if both
ﬁrms fail, ﬁrm A earns π1 and ﬁrm B earns 0.
Suppose instead that the ﬁrms have chosen a joint location. At the beginning of the
second period, ﬁrm B tries to hire the worker that was employed by ﬁrm A in the ﬁrst
period. Obviously, ﬁrm A would like to retain the worker in order to have a head start
in the second period and can take diﬀerent legal actions to achieve this goal. Foreseeing
that the worker may leave, ﬁrm A can include a covenant not to compete in the worker’s
employment contract that prevents him from working for ﬁrm B in the second period.
Another possibility is to sue ﬁrm B after the worker has left. The relative eﬀectiveness
of these measures depends on the jurisdiction and the nature of the innovation (see the
introduction). We consider primarily the possibility to go to court, and assume that if a
worker brings valuable knowledge to a rival, the hiring ﬁrm has to pay (expected) damages
of D, D ∈ [0,∞).10 This reﬂects the situation in Silicon Valley where covenants not to
compete are very seldom enforced (see Gilson, 1999).11
We model the competition for the worker in the following way. Each ﬁrm simultaneously
and independently makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to the worker. The ﬁrm who oﬀers more
hires the worker and pays the wage that it has oﬀered. Put diﬀerently, the hiring process
works like a ﬁrst-price auction. If both ﬁrms oﬀer the same wage, we assume that the ﬁrm
whose valuation of the worker is highest hires him. The tie-breaking rule ensures that an
equilibrium in pure strategies exists. We will focus on the equilibrium in which the ﬁrm
9We disregard licensing contracts, as it is very diﬃcult to license non-patented information (Arrow,
1962; Cheung, 1982).
10Notice that if expected damages are suﬃciently high, this is equivalent to strong enforcement of
covenants not to compete, because an outside ﬁrm would never ﬁnd it proﬁtable to obtain trade secrets
by poaching a worker. We discuss brieﬂy the case of covenants not to compete in section 4.
11Even if the courts of California are reluctant to enforce trade secret laws in cases that involve misappro-
priation by former employees, there have been several law suits that made headlines in the business press:
Vermont Microsystems were in 1994 awarded $25.5 million in damages, because Autodesk were found to
have used trade secrets brought by a former employee; Intel accused in 2000 Broadcom for ’poaching’
key employees to acquire its communications-chip technology and sued for damages and injunctive relief
(the case was settled out of court); Avant Corp. was in 2001 ordered to pay $182 million plus interest
t oC a d e n c eD e s i g nS y s t e m sf o rh a v i n gm a r k e t e dp r o d u c t sp a r t l yb a s e do ns o u r c ec o d eo b t a i n e df r o ma
former employee.
7hiring the worker pays exactly the rival’s valuation.12 Each ﬁrm’s valuation of the worker
depends on its outside options that we will derive later.
If ﬁrm A retains the worker, the game continues as in the subgame where the ﬁrms are
in separate locations. If ﬁrm B hires the worker, the game continues as in the state where
both ﬁrms have developed innovation 1 in the ﬁrst period.
Figure 1 illustrates the game with all the possible states of the world and the actions
taken.
[Insert Figure 1]
3S o l v i n g t h e m o d e l
We are now ready to solve the game. Let us start by computing each ﬁrm’s expected
proﬁts if they locate in separate regions. Notice that in this case there is no possibility of
labor mobility, so technology spillovers cannot arise. We proceed by backward induction.
Let Vij be ﬁrm i’s expected proﬁts before the second innovation round is resolved. Vij
is a function of the ﬁrm’s knowledge (subscript i) and the rival’s knowledge (subscript j),
with i,j ∈ {0,1} where 1 indicates that the ﬁrm in question possesses the knowledge of the
ﬁrst innovation and 0 indicates that it does not. There are four possible states of nature:
both ﬁrms have the knowledge, no ﬁrm has the knowledge, only ﬁrm A or only ﬁrm B has
the knowledge. Expected proﬁts are:
V11 = s2απ2 + s(1 − s)π2 +( 1− s)
2 απ1, (1)
V00 = s2απ1 + s(1 − s)π1,
V10 = sπ2 +( 1− s)sαπ1 +( 1− s)
2 π1,
V01 = s(1 − s)απ1,
where V10 >V 11 >V 00 >V 01 as long as π2 >π 1.
The per ﬁrm expected proﬁts at time t =0if ﬁrms locate separately are therefore:
Πsep = s2 [απ1 + V11]+s(1 − s)[π1 + V10 + V01]+( 1− s)
2 V00. (2)
We now focus on the other branch of the game tree in which ﬁrms decide to cluster at
t =0 . As above we proceed by backward induction.
12We disregard equilibria where both ﬁrms oﬀer a wage between the lowest and the highest valuation
of the worker (and where the ﬁrm with the highest valuation hires him), since in these equilibria the ﬁrm
with the lowest valuation is playing a weakly dominated strategy.
8Let us consider the hiring process. Recall that this plays a role only in asymmetric
situations. For simplicity of exposition, let us say that ﬁrm A has got innovation 1 and
ﬁrm B has not. Firm A will earn V10 if it keeps the worker, and V11 + D if it loses him
to ﬁrm B, since it will receive damages. Therefore, ﬁrm A’s valuation of the worker is
vA = Max{V10 − V11 − D,0}. Firm B will earn V11 − D if it is successful in poaching the
worker, and V01 if it is not. Firm B’s valuation of the worker is vB = Max{V11−D−V01,0}.
We focus primarily on the case where for both ﬁrms the expected damages do not exceed
the value of the worker.
A.1. D ≤ Min{V11 − V01,V 10 − V11} (trade secret protection is not excessive)
Two situations are possible: either vA ≥ vB,a n dﬁrm A keeps the worker by paying
him wns = V11 − D − V01;o rvA <v B,a n dﬁrm B hires the worker by paying him
ws = V10 − V11 − D. In the latter case, technology spillovers arise since the knowledge
becomes widespread across the industry. Notice that the worker in both cases will be
paid more than the wage in the pool. A joint location increases the expected wage of the
workers, because ﬁrms compete for the knowledge that the workers have accumulated in
their prior jobs. However, stronger trade secret protection acts in the opposite direction
by reducing the workers’ expected wage.
The following result summarizes the outcome of the hiring process:
Lemma 1 Suppose that the ﬁrms are in a joint location, and only one ﬁrm has developed
innovation 1 in the ﬁrst period. Technology spillovers arise if and only if
2V11 >V 10 + V01. (3)
Proof. The worker moves if vA <v B. After substituting, this gives the condition
reported above.
Lemma 1 says that the worker moves only if this increases expected industry proﬁts.
Notice that the strength of trade secret protection does not aﬀect the technology spillover
condition. As long as trade secret protection is not excessive, it increases the proﬁts of the
innovating ﬁrm by D and decreases the wage of the worker by the same amount, but it
does not prevent technology spillovers from occurring.
One can rewrite condition (3) as follows:








s(1 − s) − s2 (1 − 2α)
¤
π2
are the changes the expected industry proﬁts accruing from innovation 1 and innovation
2, respectively, due to technology spillovers.
First, notice that ∆E(π1) < 0 since technology spillovers both increase the probability
that innovation 1 will be replaced by innovation 2 and the probability that ﬁrms will end
up competing with the ﬁrst generation product. In turn, this implies that:
Remark 1 A necessary condition for technology spillovers to arise is ∆E(π2) > 0, i.e.
(1 − α)s<1/2.
In words, the probability to develop an innovation must be suﬃciently low and/or
competition suﬃciently soft.
It is also useful to state the following remark:
Remark 2 A necessary condition for technology spillovers to arise is π2 >π 1.
Proof. Let π2 = π1 (if π2 <π 1 the argument holds a fortiori). Then (3) implies that
1 − 2(1− α)s>(1 − s)
2 (1 − 2α)/s +2 α(1 − s). After some simpliﬁcations, one obtains
that (1 − s)3s>1,ac o n t r a d i c t i o n .
One can decompose ∆E(π2) in two parts, where s(1−s)π2 > 0 captures the increase in
expected industry proﬁts due to an overall higher probability that innovation 2 is developed
and −s2 (1 − 2α)π2 < 0 is the reduction in expected industry proﬁts due to increased
competition (i.e. higher probability of a duopoly).
Summarizing, when the worker moves from ﬁrm A to ﬁrm B, two opposing eﬀects occur
to expected industry proﬁts: (1) a positive eﬀect due to the overall higher probability that
the more valuable, second generation product is developed; (2) a negative eﬀect since ﬁrms
will be more likely to compete with either the ﬁrst or the second generation products.
The technology spillover condition, equation (3), is a function of α, s,a n dπ2/π1.W e
will refer to π2/π1 as the ’growth potential’ of the industry, because it measures how
proﬁtable the second innovation is relative to the ﬁrst. The following remark summarizes
the comparative statics with respect to these parameters.
Remark 3 Technology spillovers arise for a larger parameter space if the growth potential
of the industry is high, competition is soft, and the probability of innovating is intermediate.
10Proof. Let Φ ≡ s
1−s
π2
π1 [1 − 2(1− α)s] − (1 − s)(1− 2α) − 2sα. The proof follows
from: ∂Φ/∂(π2
π1) > 0 and ∂Φ/∂α > 0 if the conditions in Remark 1 and 2 are satisﬁed.
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Figure 2. The technology spillover condition as a function of s and α (π2/π1 =2 ). The
line indicates values of s and α such that equation (3) holds with equality. Above the
line, vA <v B and technology spillovers occur. Below the line, vA ≥ vB and ﬁrm A keeps
the worker in equilibrium.
Let us ﬁrst consider α. Since there are less rents destroyed by competition if α increases,
labor mobility is less of a threat to industry proﬁts, and technology spillovers arise for a
larger region of parameters, as Figure 2 shows. Soft competition in the product market
favors therefore technology spillovers. In a recent study on the adoption of manufacturing
technologies by 1902 Canadian plants, Joung Yeo (2002) ﬁnds evidence in this direction by
showing that technology spillovers are more likely when ﬁrms do not operate in the same
product market.
Let us now consider s. Remember that technology spillovers have two opposing ef-
fects: increased competition and a higher overall probability to develop innovation 2. s is
important for both these eﬀects, and we consider them in turn. First, notice that when
s approaches either 0 or 1, ﬁrms are very likely to end up competing on equal footing if
technology spillovers take place, but very unlikely to be competing otherwise. Since com-
petition destroys proﬁts, this works against labor mobility. Hence, the parameter space
under which technology spillovers take place expands for intermediate values of s. Sec-
11ond, and more important, technology spillovers increase the overall probability to develop
innovation 2 by s(1 − s). Such marginal increment is maximized for s =0 .5 and tends
to 0 as s approaches either 0 or 1. Again the eﬀect of a change in s is non-monotonous,
with the parameter space for which technology spillovers take place being the largest for
intermediate values of s. Figure 2 illustrates this point.
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Figure 3. The technology spillover condition for diﬀerent values of π2/π1.
Figure 3 shows the eﬀect of increasing the growth potential of the industry, π2/π1.
An increase in π2/π1 implies that it is more important in terms of expected industry
proﬁts that the second innovation is developed. This expands the region of parameters
for which technology spillovers arise. Interesting enough, technology spillovers may occur
even if competition among ﬁrms is extremely intense. Figure 3 illustrates how technology
spillovers may arise for α =0if π2/π1 is suﬃciently high and s<1/2. This is worthwhile
noting because previous theoretical analyses have found that the innovator retains the
worker and technology spillovers do not take place if competition destroys industry proﬁts
(i.e. α<0.5); see, for instance, Pakes and Nitzan (1983) and Fosfuri et al. (2001). What
drives the diﬀerence between our results and the previous literature is the assumption of
cumulative innovation. Indeed, if innovation is not cumulative the only eﬀect generated
by technology spillovers is increased competition. This always reduces industry proﬁts if
α<0.5.
This last ﬁnding is empirically important too, as it suggests that we are more likely to
observe technology spillovers when later innovations have a much larger value than earlier
12ones. The prospect of future proﬁts then outweighs the importance of actual proﬁts.
High-tech industries (telecommunications, semiconductors, software, biotechnology), that
are typically associated with high rates of skilled labor mobility, seem to constitute an
ideal test-bed for our model. A somewhat diﬀerent interpretation of this result is that
we are more likely to observe technology spillovers when innovation 1 is based on basic
knowledge with little commercial value, whereas innovation 2 is an application with a much
larger market and value.13 Zucker and Darby (1996) and Zucker et al. (1998) document
the importance of technology spillovers through the mobility of star scientists (i.e. highly
productive individuals who discovered a major breakthrough) in the US biotechnology
industry. Biotechnology is an industry par excellence where basic research plays a crucial
role. Similarly, Almeida and Kogut (1999) show that the localization of knowledge and the
mobility of engineers are critical factors in semiconductors, another industry where basic
research is important (for instance, advances in material sciences are crucial in the search
for new materials).
At this stage we are now able to compute the expected proﬁts of the ﬁrms when they






s2 (απ1 + V11)+s(1 − s)(π1 +2 V11 − ws)+( 1− s)
2 V00
if 2V11 ≥ V10 + V01,




where ws = V10 − V11 − D and wns = V11 − V01 − D.
We can now analyze the initial location choice of the ﬁrms.
Proposition 1 Firms choose to locate in the same region if and only if
2V11 − V10 − V01 >w s = V10 − V11 − D. (6)
Proof. It follows directly from comparing (2) and (5).
First notice that the condition for ﬁrms to cluster is more stringent than the one driving
technology spillovers. Technology spillovers are the only reason to cluster in our model.
Therefore, ﬁrms would not cluster if technology spillovers could not arise, as a joint location
would increase the expected wage of the workers and bring no beneﬁts.14
13For instance, innovation 1 could be a research tool, which enables the development of innovation 2,
but has no direct commercial value (π1 =0 ).
14Of course, the ﬁrms may cluster for reasons that are not captured in our model; see the discussion in
the introduction.
13Suppose now that (3) is satisﬁed, so technology spillovers can arise when ﬁrms cluster.
The choice to cluster can be seen as an ex-ante agreement to share the knowledge of the
ﬁrst innovation in states where only one ﬁrm is successful. Ex-post, technology spillovers
reduce the proﬁts of the successful ﬁrm and increase the proﬁts of the unsuccessful one.
However, as (3) holds, the successful ﬁrm loses less than the unsuccessful ﬁrm gains,
so technology spillovers increase expected joint proﬁts (gross of wages). It follows that
technology spillovers also increase ex-ante expected proﬁts, since ﬁrms are equally likely
to end up as the successful or the unsuccessful ﬁrm. The cost associated with technology
spillovers is the higher expected wage earned by the workers due to the competition in
the labor market. Condition (6) thus simply states that ﬁrms cluster if and only if the
beneﬁts from technology spillovers (the left hand side of condition 6) are greater than the
additional wage bill (the right hand side of condition 6).
Proposition 1 shows that stronger trade secret protection, higher D, induces ﬁrms to
cluster in a larger region of the parameter space because the rents captured by the workers
are reduced. Stronger trade secret protection is therefore welfare improving since when
technology spillovers arise in equilibrium, they increase both industry proﬁts, expected
wages of the workers, and competition in the product market.
Corollary 1 An increase in the strength of trade secret protection does not prevent spillovers,
enlarges the parameter space under which clustering takes place, and is always (weakly)
welfare improving.
Two caveats are in place at this point. First, clustering is not necessarily welfare
improving once ﬁrms’ R&D choices are endogenized, see section 4.1. Second, if trade
secret protection is so strong that it exceeds the value of the worker to the hiring ﬁrm,
technology spillovers would never occur unless ﬁrms privately agreed on establishing a
reduced level of damage compensation. Presumably, such negotiations are diﬃcult, and
ﬁr m sm a yn o ta l w a y sb ea b l et or e a c ht h ej o i n tp r o ﬁt maximizing outcome. Thus, very
strong trade secret protection may actually be worse than no protection as it can prevent













Figure 4. The equilibrium location of the ﬁrms (π2/π1 =3 ;D =0 ). Above the solid line,
the ﬁrms cluster and below they locate separately. The dashed line indicates the
technology spillover condition.
Condition (6), as a function of our exogenous parameters, α, s,a n dπ2
π1, is illustrated
in Figure 4. Similarly to condition (3), condition (6) is more likely to be satisﬁed for high
values of π2/π1 and α, and for intermediate values of s. This suggests that local industrial
districts with high levels of labor turnover, like Silicon Valley, are associated with indus-
tries (biotechnology, semiconductors) where the prospect of future proﬁts outweighs the
importance of actual proﬁts. It is less likely that we observe clustering and high labor mo-
bility in industries with low growth potential. Finally, ﬁrms in clustered industries should,
ceteris paribus, pay higher wages for the same job. Our model would thus predict a posi-
tive correlation between the growth potential of the industry, the geographic concentration
of R&D activities, job mobility, and skilled labor wages.
4E x t e n s i o n s
We consider diﬀerent extensions of the basic model presented in section 3. To save space,
all proofs have been left out but are available upon request.
4.1 Endogenous R&D
So far, we have not analyzed R&D decisions explicitly, but have simply assumed that
ﬁrms are blessed with an exogenous probability to innovate. Here, we discuss how our
results change once R&D is endogenized. Successful R&D will usually be the result of an
15investment by the ﬁrm and eﬀorts by the workers. For clarity, we consider two polar cases:
One where only the ﬁrm’s investment matters, and another where it is the worker’s eﬀort
that is crucial. The formal analysis of the former case can be found in appendix.
4.1.1 R&D Investment by the Firm
We consider a setup where ﬁrms choose in each period their own probability to develop an
innovation (i.e. their R&D intensity). The R&D decision is taken after a worker has been
hired. The game remains otherwise unchanged with respect to our basic model in section
3. We assume that the cost of R&D is quadratic. If ﬁrm k ∈ {A,B} chooses a probability
sk to innovate, it must incur a cost γ(sk)2/2.T h ep a r a m e t e rγ controls for how costly the
R&D activity is.
Solving backwards, the ﬁrst step is to compute the equilibrium R&D intensities in
the second period given the knowledge available to the ﬁrms. Then, one can derive the
corresponding second-period equilibrium proﬁts, Vij. As in the basic model, technology
spillovers arise if and only if V10 + V01 > 2V11. A closer inspection of this condition
shows that the parameter space under which technology spillovers arise expands, roughly
speaking, for larger values of α and π2
π1. The parameter γ plays a role similar to our
exogenous s in section 3. One can show that the endogenous R&D intensities are inversely
related to γ. Technology spillovers occur, as the previous analysis would suggest, for
intermediate values of γ where the equilibrium R&D intensities also are intermediate. No
technology spillovers occur for low (high) values of γ where R&D intensities are high (low).
Moving upwards in the game tree, one can solve for the equilibrium R&D intensities in
the ﬁrst period. These intensities depend on the location decision and on whether technol-
ogy spillovers can arise in the second period. When ﬁrms cluster in the ﬁrst period, R&D
intensities can be shown to be increasing with the strength of trade secret protection. Un-
like in the basic model, trade secret laws play the important role of stimulating investment
in R&D. Still, one can show that as long as trade secret protection is not excessive (i.e. the
equivalent of assumption A.1. holds), ﬁrst-period R&D intensities are the highest when
ﬁrms separate. The reason is that technology spillovers generate a free-riding problem: A
ﬁrm that was unsuccessful in the ﬁrst period can (sometimes) hire the rival’s worker and
acquire the knowledge of innovation 1 in the second period. The possibility of free-riding
on the rival’s investment reduces ﬁrms’ incentives to invest in R&D in the ﬁrst period.15
15We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting to us this possibility.
16As a last step, one needs to compare the two-period expected proﬁts under clustering
and under separation. Again, it turns out that technology spillovers are a necessary but not
suﬃcient condition for clustering and that the conditions favoring technology spillovers also
lead to more clustering (high values of α and π2
π1, and intermediate values of γ). Overall,
endogenizing the R&D investment does not invalidate the comparative statics obtained in
section 3. However, our ﬁnding that clustering was always welfare improving is not any
longer so clear-cut, because ﬁrst-period R&D intensities are lower under clustering than
under separation. Without specifying in greater details the demand structure and the
mode of competition, we cannot undertake a full welfare analysis. It might well be that
clustering is still welfare enhancing for all acceptable parameter values, but we cannot be
sure of this.16 This points out that whereas most of our ﬁndings are pretty robust, our
conclusion about welfare should be taken with caution.
4.1.2 R&D Investment by the Workers
The eﬀorts of key researchers are often crucial for R&D success, and it is in the interest
of a ﬁrm to provide its researchers with high-powered incentive schemes. Although objec-
tive measures of R&D success, such as patents, publications, and proﬁts, are sometimes
available, in most cases it is diﬃcult to write employment contracts that are contingent on
R&D outcomes. A ﬁrm can promise to reward a successful researcher, but such a promise
is usually not legally binding. The ﬁrm faces then a commitment problem: Ex-ante, it is
optimal to promise to reward a successful researcher to provide incentives. Ex-post, once
the innovation has been made, it is tempting for the ﬁrm to renege on this promise.
O n eo ft h er e s u l t si ns e c t i o n3i st h a t ,w h e nﬁrms choose to cluster, workers who possess
the knowledge of innovation 1 command a higher expected wage in period 2. Hence,
locating in a high-tech cluster could serve as a commitment to reward successful workers
and might result in higher R&D eﬀorts in the ﬁrst period compared to separation.17 In a
related work, Motta and Rønde (2002) develop this idea in the context of covenants not
to compete. They show that it can be optimal not to include a covenant not to compete
in the employment contract to let a successful worker get outside oﬀers and alleviate
16In fact, without specifying these details we do not even know whether ﬁrms over or underinvest in R&D
compared to the ﬁrst-best, since ﬁrms’ R&D decisions generate two externalities going in opposite direc-
tions. First, ﬁrms do not take into account the eﬀect of their own R&D investment on their competitor’s
proﬁts. Second, ﬁrms ignore the part of the value created by the innovation that accrues to consumers.
The ﬁrst externality pushes towards overinvestment in R&D and the second towards underinvestment.
17In our two-period setup clustering would have no eﬀect on eﬀorts in the second period, because
ﬁrms only compete for the workers once. Motta and Rønde (2002) study an inﬁnite horizon setup where
reputation concerns sometimes solve the commitment problem.
17the commitment problem described above. Contrary to our previous analysis, this also
suggests that when the R&D eﬀorts of the workers play a crucial role, stronger trade
secret protection might result in a lower level of innovation activity, because wages are
reduced.
4.2 No wealth and credit constraints
The workers earn an expected wage above 0 (the reservation wage) in the second period
when ﬁrms cluster. The workers would therefore be willing to accept a negative ﬁrst-
period wage as long as they could survive the ﬁrst period by consuming initial wealth or
borrowing on the capital markets. Of course, the expected wage over the two periods must
be non-negative. Suppose that the workers have access to an initial wealth or credit of
w0 > 0. Assuming that the total amount of money available for consumption each period
should be non-negative, the ﬁrst-period wage cannot be lower than −w0. Solving the game
as before, we obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 2 Suppose that 2V11 >V 10 + V01, so technology spillovers can arise when
ﬁrms choose a joint location. For w0 <s (1 − s)(V10 − V11 − D),t h eﬁrms cluster if and
only if
s(1 − s)[2V11 − (V10 + V01) − (V10 − V11 − D)] + w0 ≥ 0. (7)
For w0 ≥ s(1−s)(V10−V11−D), the workers earn no expected rents, and the ﬁrms always
cluster. If 2V11 <V 10 +V01,t h eﬁr m sa l w a y s( w e a k l y )p r e f e rt ol o c a t ei ns e p a r a t er e g i o n s .
We see by comparing (6) and (7) that the ﬁrms cluster for a larger region of the
parameter space when the wealth-constraint is relaxed. The negative ﬁrst-period wage
allows the ﬁrms to extract (some of) the rents earned by the workers, which makes it more
attractive to choose a joint location.18
4.3 Finite relocation costs for workers
In section 3, we have assumed that it is prohibitively expensive to hire a worker employed
in a diﬀerent region. Now, we allow for lower levels of relocation costs. Suppose that ﬁrm
i has to pay a ﬁxed cost k>0 when poaching the worker from ﬁrm j located in a diﬀerent
region. Here, there are diﬀerent cases to consider. First, if 2V11 ≤ V10 + V01, technology
spillovers do not arise independently of k and ﬁrms’ locations. The ﬁr m st h u ss e p a r a t e ,
18This leads to the empirical prediction that workers in a high-tech cluster will have a steeper earnings
proﬁle over time than workers outside a cluster.
18because the relocation costs reduce the wage of the workers. Second, if 2V11 >V 10+V01+k,
technology spillovers arise both under clustering and separation. It is optimal to cluster
to avoid paying the relocation costs. Finally, the most interesting case happens when
V10 + V01 < 2V11 ≤ V10 + V01 + k. Here, technology spillovers arise only if ﬁrms cluster.
We need to distinguish between two subcases. If k>V 11 − V01 − D, the lagging ﬁrm is
not interested in hiring a worker from a ﬁr ml o c a t e di na n o t h e rr e g i o n .T h u s ,t h ea n a l y s i s
developed in section 3 remains unchanged. On the other hand, if k<V 11 − V01 − D,t h e
lagging ﬁrm is willing to pay up to V11−V01−D−k>0 to attract the worker. The model
c a nt h e nb es o l v e da si ns e c t i o n3 .W eo b t a i nt h a tﬁrms cluster if and only if:
2V11 − (V10 + V01) ≥ V10 − V11 − D | {z }
wage clustering (ws)




2V11 − (V10 + V01) ≥
k
2
if k<V 11 − V01 − D,
2V11 − (V10 + V01) ≥ V10 − V11 − D otherwise.
Notice that for low levels of relocation costs, the protection provided by separate locations
is stronger the greater is k. Therefore, the proﬁts under separation are increasing in k,
which in turn makes clustering less attractive. For high relocation costs, we ﬁnd again
condition (6). Removing the assumption of prohibitively high relocation costs changes the
threshold for which ﬁrms cluster, but the basic trade-oﬀ of the model remains.
4.4 The knowledge is embedded in the worker
We now allow for the possibility that the innovating ﬁrm experiences a loss of knowledge
when the worker moves to a rival. This could, for example, be because the employee
’hides’ some of the relevant knowledge, or b e c a u s es o m eo ft h ek n o w l e d g ei st a c i ta n d
diﬃcult to articulate. Such a loss of knowledge translates into a lower probability to
develop innovation 2. To capture this possibility, we assume that if the worker leaves the
probability to develop innovation 2 is µs with µ ≤ 1. The formal analysis remains basically
unchanged with respect to section 3. Suppose that only ﬁrm A develops innovation 1. The
expected proﬁts of ﬁrm A if it loses the worker are now: V A
11(µ)=µs2απ2+µs(1 − s)π2+
(1 − s)(1− µs)απ1+D. Similarly, the expected proﬁts of ﬁrm B if it hires the worker are:
V B
11(µ)=µs2απ2+s(1 − µs)π2+(1 − s)(1− µs)απ1−D. Following the analysis in section
3, it is easy to show that technology spillovers only occur if V A
11(µ)+V B
11(µ) >V 10 + V01
where V10 and V01 are given by (1). Notice that only the left hand side of the inequality
19depends on µ. One can show that the derivative of the left hand side of the inequality
with respect to µ is always positive. This implies that the larger is µ the larger is the
parameter space for which technology spillovers take place. Firms cluster if and only if
V A
11(µ)+V B
11(µ)−(V10+V01) >V 10−V A
11(µ)−D, and this inequality is laxer for higher values
of µ. In other words, when the movement of the worker implies a loss of knowledge for the
innovating ﬁrm, it is less likely that we observe clustering and technology spillovers. In
the limit for µ =0 , one can show that technology spillovers never take place. As a result,
ﬁrms do not cluster. Here, the worker’s mobility would simply shift R&D capabilities
from ﬁrm A to ﬁrm B without increasing the overall probability to develop innovation 2.
Furthermore, some proﬁts would be dissipated because both ﬁrms would have innovation
1 and compete in the product market. In sum, our results derived in section 3 rely on
knowledge being a public good within the innovating ﬁrm.
4.5 Injunctive relief and covenant not to compete
Suing for damages is not the only means available to a ﬁrm of protecting its trade secrets
against misappropriation. For instance, it can seek an injunctive relief when the worker
leaves or can include a covenant not to compete in the labor contract. We can model these
two options in a similar way by assuming that if an employee with valuable knowledge is
hired by a rival ﬁrm, there is a probability p that a court will prevent him from working
for his new employer. p is either the probability that the court grants injunctive relief or
enforces a covenant not to compete. We assume that the new employer has to pay the
wage oﬀered no matter the outcome of a trial. Also, let D =0 .
Suppose that ﬁrm A has developed the ﬁrst innovation, but ﬁrm B has not. The
ﬁrms’ valuations of the worker are modiﬁed as follows: v
0
A =( 1 − p)(V10 − V11) and
v
0
B =( 1− p)(V11 − V01),b e c a u s eﬁrm B can only exploit the knowledge with probability




B, it follows that labor turnover takes place exactly for the same
parameter space that we derived in section 3. However, when labor turnover occurs,
technology spillovers arise only with probability (1 − p). Solving the model as before, we
obtain that ﬁrms cluster if and only if 2V11 − V10 − V01 ≥ V10 − V11. The strength of
trade secret protection does not aﬀect ﬁrms’ ex-ante incentives to cluster, because trade
secret protection has two eﬀects that cancel exactly out. On the one hand, stronger trade
secret protection reduces the wage that workers receive, which, in turn, reduces the costs
of clustering. On the other hand, there are fewer technology spillovers, which reduce the
20beneﬁts of clustering.
Proposition 3 Post-employment covenants not to compete and the possibility to seek an
injunctive relief reduce the amount of technology spillovers that arise in a cluster and do
not increase ﬁrms’ incentives to cluster.
A system of trade secret protection based on covenants not to compete or the possibility
to seek an injunctive relief behave quite diﬀerently from one based on punitive damages.
Indeed, stronger protection does not induce more clustering. Instead, it prevents technol-
ogy spillovers from arising when ﬁrms locate in the same region. In this sense, our model
provides some support to Gilson (1999)’s claim that the lack of enforceable covenants not
to compete has spurred labor mobility and innovation in Silicon Valley.
5C o n c l u s i o n
Motivated by the recent debate about the reasons underpinning the success of Silicon
Valley, we have studied ﬁrms’ incentives to cluster in order to beneﬁt from reciprocal
technology spillovers. Generally speaking, we ﬁnd that the story of Silicon Valley, as told
by economic geographers and other scholars, is consistent from an economic point of view.
Our formal model, however, allows us to pin down the crucial assumptions behind the
argument. We ﬁnd that ﬁrms’ incentives to cluster are the strongest when the following
three conditions are met: 1) the value of later innovations is high relative to earlier ones;
2) competition in the product market is relatively soft; 3) the probability of a single ﬁrm
to develop an innovation is neither very high nor very low. Especially the ﬁrst condition is
important for empirical research. It suggests that clustering and technology spillovers are
more likely to be observed in industries with high growth potential. Hence, a standard OLS
regression aimed at quantifying the beneﬁts of clustering and technology spillovers on ﬁrms’
proﬁtability might produce biased estimates, if it does not control for this characteristic.
This ﬁnding also warns policy makers against the attempt of trying to ”clone” the success
of Silicon Valley in industries that have structurally much smaller growth potential.
In addition, our model predicts that in industries where clustering is driven by tech-
nology spillovers, labor turnover is high and skilled workers receive, ceteris paribus, higher
wages. These ﬁndings seem to ﬁt well with the stories of industries such as semiconductors
and biotechnology (Zucker and Darby, 1996; Almeida and Kogut, 1999).
Interesting enough, our model also suggests that weak trade secret protection might
21not be a prerequisite for clustering and labor mobility as some legal scholars have recently
argued. Indeed, we show that a system of trade secret protection based on punitive dam-
ages, except in some extreme cases, is beneﬁcial for ﬁrms’ proﬁts, stimulates clustering,
and is not an impediment to workers’ mobility. However, trade secret protection that
prevents technology spillovers from arising (post-employment covenants not to compete,
injunctive relief, or excessive damages) does not induce clustering. Instead, proﬁts are
reduced because, although ﬁrms have clustered, technology spillovers do not materialize.
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 A Endogenous R&D
In this appendix we develop the formal analysis on which our discussion in section 4.1 is
based. The timing and other details of the game can be found in section 4.1.
We proceed by backward induction, and start by looking at the choice of the second
period R&D intensity. For each ﬁrm, this decision depends both on its own and the rival’s
knowledge. Therefore, we need to distinguish between three diﬀerent cases depending on
whether two, one, or none of the ﬁrms have the knowledge of the ﬁrst innovation.
Second period R&D intensities. Before deriving the equilibria in R&D intensities,
we need to introduce some additional notation. Denote by sk
ij the R&D intensity of ﬁrm
k ∈ {A,B}.S u b s c r i p t si and j,w h e r ei,j ∈ {0,1}, indicate in the same way as in section 3




ji) is the expected second period proﬁto fﬁrm k a saf u n c t i o no fi t so w nR & D
intensity (sk
ij) and the intensity of its competitor (sl
ji), k,l ∈ {A,B}. Finally, s∗
ij and
Vij ≡ V k
ij(s∗
ij,s ∗
ji) are the R&D intensity and expected second period proﬁt in equilibrium.
We will keep the equivalent of assumption A.1., and impose the following two restric-
tions on the parameters, which guarantee that equilibrium solutions are interior and make
some of the proofs easier:
A.2. γ>M a x {π2 − π1,απ2} and π2 ≥ 2π1.
Let us start with the case in which both ﬁrms have the knowledge of the ﬁrst innovation.
























γ + π2 − α(π2 + π1)
.( 8 )
Consider now the case in which only ﬁrm k has the knowledge of the ﬁrst innovation.






























26Notice that V l
01(sl
01,s k
10) <α π 1 for all (sl
01,s k
10). Solving for the equilibrium in R&D
intensities, one obtains the following:
s∗
10 =
γ(π2 − π1)+α(1 − α)π2
1




απ1(γ − π2 + π1)
γ2 + α(1 − α)π2
1
. (9)
Finally, consider the last case where neither ﬁrm was successful in the ﬁrst period. The


















γ +( 1− α)π1
. (10)
In each of the three cases, the equilibrium in R&D intensities is unique in pure strategies
and stable.
Lemma 2 Under assumption A.2., the second period equilibrium R&D intensities can








10/∂γ < 0 whereas ∂s∗
01/∂γ ≶ 0.
Proof. First, consider the ranking of the R&D intensities. The ﬁrst and the last
inequality follow directly from A.2., (8), and (9). Consider s∗
01 <s ∗
00.I tc a nb es h o w nt h a t
∂(s∗
00 − s∗
01)/∂π2 > 0. In addition notice that s∗
00 >s ∗
01 for π2 =2 π1. Hence, whenever
A.2. holds s∗
01 <s ∗
00. A similar argument would show that s∗
00 <s ∗
10.I t c a n b e s h o w n




00 takes on a
constant sign for all γ>0.S i n c es∗
00 <s ∗
11 for γ = π1, it follows that s∗
00 <s ∗
11. Finally,
numerical examples conﬁrm that s∗
11 ≶ s∗
10 (see also Figure 1). From A.2. and (8), (9),
and (10), we have that s∗
00, s∗
11,a n ds∗
10 are decreasing in γ. Numerical examples show
that ∂s∗
01/∂γ ≶ 0.
The lemma shows that a ﬁrm invests more in R&D for any given level of the rival’s
knowledge if it has the knowledge of the ﬁrst innovation. However, the R&D intensity
is not necessarily decreasing in the knowledge of the competitor, as one would perhaps
expect. Indeed, s∗
11 may be greater than s∗
10 d u et oar a c i n ge x t e r n a l i t y .N o t i c et h a tt h e
parameter γ plays a role similar to the exogenous probability of success, s,i nt h eb a s i c
model insofar as lower (higher) values of γ correspond, at least for the leading ﬁrms, to
higher (lower) R&D intensities.
27Lemma 3 Under assumption A.2., the equilibrium proﬁts in the second period can be
ranked as follows: 0 <V 01 <V 00,V 11 <V 10.





01=0> 0, which implies that V ∗
01 > 0.I ti s











Using these two results and Lemma 2, one can establish the following:







































Consider now V01 and V11.I tc a nb es h o w nt h a t
sign{V ∗
11 − απ1} ≡ sign
©
γπ2 +2 α2π1(π1 + π2) − απ1(3γ +2 π2)
ª
. Notice that the latter
is non-negative for all π2 ≥ 2π1. Therefore, we have that V ∗
11 ≥ απ1 >V∗
01.
Additionally, since V00 is increasing in α and decreasing in γ, the maximum value of
V00 under A.2. is 2π1/9 (for γ = π1 and α =1 /2). This concludes the analysis of the
R&D stage in the second period. We now turn to the previous stages of the game. Let
us start by looking at the case in which ﬁrms choose separate locations and no technology
spillovers can arise.
Separation Denote by sk
sep the R&D intensity of ﬁrm k in the ﬁrst period. The expected







































[π1 + V10 − V00] > 0 for all sl
sep,
which implies that s∗
sep > 0. Solving for the Nash equilibrium in R&D intensities, we ﬁnd:
s∗
sep =m i n
½
V10 − V00 + π1









focus on the other branch of the game tree in which ﬁrms decide to cluster.


















Figure 1: The technology spillover condition when R&D intensities are endogenous (π1 =
1, π2 =6 ).
Clustering Technology spillovers can potentially arise when ﬁrms cluster, and the hiring
stage is analyzed in the same way as in section 3. One can show that technology spillovers
take place if and only if V01 + V10 < 2V11. Due to labor market competition workers earn
a positive expected wage: ws = V10 − V11 − D and wns = V11 − V01 − D. As before, the
technology spillover condition does not depend on D.
Due to the functional forms involved, it is not possible to do comparative statics on the
technology spillover condition explicitely, and we rely instead on numerical simulations.
Figure 1 illustrates the technology spillover condition for π1 =3and π2 =6 .O n t h e
vertical axis we have the degree of competition, α. On the horizontal axis we have γ,
which measures the cost of R&D. The ﬁgure shows that technology spillovers occur for
soft competition (higher values of α) and intermediate values of γ. Additional simulations
- available from the authors upon request - show that the parameter space under which
technology spillovers materialize increases for larger values of π2
π1.
To grasp some additional insights on the comparative statics with respect to γ,w e
will compare it to our analysis of the basic model in section 3. Let us look at the R&D
intensities for diﬀerent values of γ. Technology spillovers occur if V10 + V01 > 2V11.T h e




11. In Figure 1 these intensities are indicated for α =0 .36 and γ =7 ,18,45.T h eﬁrms
29cluster for γ =1 8and separate for γ =7 and γ =4 5 . The expected proﬁto faﬁrm that
has not the knowledge of the ﬁrst innovation, V01, is very low compared to V10 and V11,a n d
the technology spillover condition is mainly driven by V10 and V11. This can also be seen
from Figure 1 where s∗
01 remains low compared to s∗
10 and s∗
11 for all three selected values
of γ.W ec a nt h u sf o c u so n l yo ns∗
10 and s∗
11 in the discussion. Notice that s∗
10 and s∗
11 are
relatively high (low) for γ =7(γ =4 5 ) where the R&D cost is low (high). Similarly, s∗
10
and s∗
11 are intermediate for γ =1 8where the R&D cost is intermediate. We arrive at the
conclusion that technology spillovers arise for γ =1 8where the endogenous probabilities
to develop innovation 2, s∗
10 and s∗
11, are intermediate. This result is analogous to Remark
3 that shows that technology spillovers arise in the basic model for intermediate values of
s.
We can now analyze the choice of R&D intensity. Denote by sk
clust the R&D intensity
of ﬁrm k in the ﬁrst period. Notice that this choice depends on the occurrence or not of







    
    
sk
clust(1 − sl






(V11 − ws − D)
+sk
clustsl
clust (απ1 + V11)+( 1− sk
clust)(1 − sl
clust)V00 − γ(sk
clust)2/2 if 2V11 >V 10 + V01
sk
clustsl
clust (απ1 + V11)+sk
clust(1 − sl











Using Lemma 3 and V00 <π 1,i tc a nb es h o w nt h a ts∗




















The next lemma shows that stronger protection of trade secrets increases ﬁrms’ incen-
tives to invest in R&D in the ﬁrst period.
Lemma 4 s∗
clust is increasing in D for s∗
clust < 1.
Proof. It follows immediately from (12).
Thus, stricter enforcement of trade secret laws has the expected result of stimulating
ex-ante incentives to invest in R&D. This is a well-known result and it constitutes the
main motivation behind the existence of intellectual property rights.




30The Location Decision We are now ready to analyze the initial choice of location.
Firms choose to cluster if and only if Πclust ≥ Πsep. The next proposition shows that the
ﬁrms, as in our basic model, only cluster if technology spillovers arise.
Proposition 4 Technology spillovers are a necessary condition for ﬁrms to cluster.
Proof. We want show that the two-period expected proﬁts when ﬁrms cluster and no
technology spillovers arise are no greater than the two-period expected proﬁts when ﬁrms
choose separate locations. Notice that such proﬁts only diﬀer in the state where the ﬁrm
in question is the only one to innovate in the ﬁrst period. Proﬁts are then π1 + V10 in
the second period when ﬁrms separate and π1 + V10 − wns when they cluster. It follows
from (11) and (12) that Π∗
clust = Π∗
sep for wns =0(i.e. D = V10 − V11). We prove the
proposition by showing that ∂Πclust/∂(π1+V10−wns) > 0. This implies that Πclust < Πsep












clust(V10 − wns +( 1− α)π1 − V11)+( 1− sclust)(V00 − V10)
V10 − wns + π1 − V00
¶
.
This is positive if:
s∗
clust ≤
V10 − wns + π1 − V01 − 2V00
V10 − wns +( 1− α)π1 + V01 − V11 − V00
≡ e s.
Using wns = V11 − V10 − D,w eh a v et h a ts∗
clust ≤ e s if and only if:
γ ≥ (V00 − V01)
µ
1+
V00 − V11 − απ1
V10 − V11 + V01 + D + π1 + V01 − 2V00
¶
≡ e γ.
From Lemma 3, V00 ≤ 2π1/9,a n dA . 2 . ,w eh a v e :










Hence, ∂Πclust/∂(π1 + V10 − wns) > 0 for D<V 10 − V11, which completes the proof.
We use again numerical simulations to do comparative statics. Figure 2 shows both
the technology spillover condition and the condition for ﬁrms to cluster. We see that
technology spillovers are a necessary condition for ﬁrms to cluster. However, technology
spillovers are not a suﬃcient condition due to the increased wage earned by the workers.
The conditions that favor spillovers also favor clustering. These results mimic our ﬁndings
in section 3.
Finally, the last lemma shows that R&D intensities in the ﬁrst period are higher under
separation than under clustering because of the free-riding problem described in the text.











Figure 2: The equilibrium location of the ﬁrms when R&D intensities are endogenous
(π1 =1 , π2 =6 ,D =0 .5). Above the solid line, the ﬁrms cluster and below they locate
separately. The dashed line indicates the technology spillover condition.
Lemma 5 The R&D intensities in the ﬁrst period are lower when ﬁrms cluster than when
they separate.
Proof. It follows from (11) and (12) that s∗
clust <s ∗
sep when technology spillovers do
not arise. Suppose that technology spillovers occur. It follows from Lemma 4 that s∗
clust
is increasing in D. Therefore, under A.1. it is enough to show that s∗
clust <s ∗
sep for
D = V10 − V11. Indeed, we have that
s∗
clust =
V10 − V00 + π1
V11 − V00 + γ +( 1− α)π1
<
V10 − V00 + π1
V10 + V01 − V11 − V00 + γ +( 1− α)π1
= s∗
sep,
because 2V11 − (V10 + V01) > 0.
32